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1 Introduction
Since the 1990s automotive manufacturers have changed their strategies towards
internationalisation and vertical disintegration, and have passed the responsibility
for design and product development to their suppliers, providing very little support
beyond design specifications (Sturgeon, 2002). This process has fuelled an expectation
that these deeply capable suppliers will gain an independent stance vis-a© -vis their
customers (page 455), implying a potentially favourable opportunity for a more
balanced relationship between the powerful automotive manufacturers and their rela-
tively powerless component suppliers (Borrus et al, 2000; Follis et al, 2002; Humphrey
and Memedovic, 2003; Humphrey et al, 2000; MacDuffie and Helper, 2005; Sadler,
1998; Shimokawa, 1999). Through direct participation in such chains, it has been
suggested, component manufacturers in newly industrialising countries may be able
to leverage design capabilities and upgrade by moving from manufacturing to compo-
nent design (Sturgeon and Lester, 2004). Evidence of this can be observed in several
high-performing newly industrialised Asian economies, such as Korea, Malaysia,
Taiwan, Thailand, and China, where it is believed that in time such companies may
develop capabilities in the conceptualisation, design, and manufacture of finished
products under their own brands, allowing them to emerge as leading firms in their
own right.
It would be fair to say, however, that industrial upgrading through involvement in
global chains of automotive lead firms is not without problems. AlthoughWestern lead
firms have increased their involvement in peripheral economies, their increasing reli-
ance on large global suppliers based in the West to support their global operations has
presented challenges to the upgrading paths pursued by some East Asian economies in
the past (Sturgeon and Lester, 2004). There is evidence that many firms have retreated
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from the strategy of own-brand production to that of own-design manufacture or
own-equipment manufacture, and that for many firms the upgrading path stops at
the design phase (Sturgeon and Lester, 2004). What is more, in economies that have
not performed as well as those mentioned above, many domestic firms have failed to
establish such less asymmetrical relations since they do not possess the competencies
required for such relations to develop (Humphrey and Schmiz, 2004; Sturgeon and
Lester, 2004). It is evident that they have been generally locked in to low-end produc-
tion, which requires limited competences in meeting the cost, flexibility, and quality
requirements of their customers (Barnes and Kaplinsky, 2000; Evren, 2002; Humphrey,
2000; 2003a; Humphrey and Memedovic, 2003). It has also been suggested that the
upgrading of capabilities by these manufacturers has become increasingly difficult due
to the challenges presented to suppliers in developing economies by the rise of global
lead firms (Sturgeon and Lester, 2004).
In this paper these assertions will be revisited through an investigation of the shifts in
value chain governance and upgrading in Bursa, an automotive component production
node in Turkey, which became integrated into the European and global automotive system
after the 1990s. Building on the global value chain (GVC) typology suggested by Gereffi
et al (2005), and a questionnaire survey of 103 component suppliers, it was observed that
component suppliers in Bursa, have gained design and product-development competences
and that, as a result of this, European and global lead firms have turned to the creation
of modular value chains for sourcing from these suppliers. This point is important in that
it conflicts with suggestions that the diffusion of design competencies is confined to the
direct suppliers of vehicle manufacturers, or to some Asian suppliers which have
moved up the automotive value chain (Steinfeld, 2004; Sturgeon and Lester, 2004;
Takayasu and Mori, 2004), and that the possibility for the development of innovation
capabilities in less favoured regions is less likely (Evren, 2002, page 299). Instead,
evidence from Bursa suggests that the consequences of the current reorganisation of
the automotive industry have resulted in a further diffusion of design competences
among suppliers on the periphery of automotive productionöas has been the case for
some suppliers in Bursa.
This leads to the question of how this change in the distribution of power and, hence,
shift in value chain governance, will affect the prospects of Turkish suppliers for upgrad-
ing. Providing an answer to this question is important, as current literature anticipates that
less asymmetrical relationships lead to a move towards higher value-added activities
(Humphrey, 2003b; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002a; 2004; Schmitz, 2004). This assertion
is tested in this paper through a quantitative analysis in which the different types of GVC
governance observed in Bursa are compared in terms of differences in innovation activities
associated with process, product, and functional upgrading. The results suggest that,
although design and product-development responsibilities have been passed to suppli-
ers in Bursa, leading-edge innovation activities, such as marketing and branding, have
remained with the lead firms. It follows from this new evidence that the question of
whether or not this development entails less asymmetrical relationships is a compli-
cated subject, with further complexities encountered when attempting to define
whether these suppliers have encroached upon the core competences of their custom-
ers. The case study provided in this paper indicates that the reorganisation of the
automotive industry provided additional opportunities for Turkish suppliers, and
allowed the diffusion of design and product-development capabilitiesöincluding
some that had typically been controlled by lead firms. However, the results of
the study also suggest that this responsibility has been passed on more due to the
willingness of global lead firms to relinquish these functions in the ongoing reorga-
nisation of the automotive industry than to the success of Turkish suppliers in
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encroaching upon the once core competences of their customers. Hence, it is argued
in this paper that despite the increasing competences of Turkish suppliers, power
asymmetries in the value chains of their lead firms continue to exist, and lead firms
continue to have a major influence on the type of upgrading strategies that are open
to their suppliers.
Before examining these findings in detail I first provide an overview of the reorganisa-
tion of the global supply industry, outlining the subsequent changes in the governance
of the global automotive value chain, and then discuss the implications on supplier
upgrading. I then draw on evidence from field research to explore how shifts in
the governance of the global automotive value chain have impacted upon supplier
upgrading in Bursa.
2 Reorganisation of the global supply industry, changing power relations, and shifts
in global value chain governance
Since the late 1980s and 1990s the automotive industry has undergone a significant
restructuring. Lead firms have decreased their degree of vertical integration, identify-
ing and focusing on core competences such as product development, marketing,
and other activities related to brand development, while outsourcing and transferring
responsibility for a broad range of noncore activities to specialised suppliers. Since the
late 1980s global leaders have been outsourcing their production activities, increasingly
incorporating suppliers from many developing countries (Humphrey, 2003b; Sadler,
1999); and more recently, they have even turned over design and product-development
tasks to specialised external suppliers (Humphrey and Memedovic, 2003; Sadler, 1998;
1999; Sturgeon and Lester, 2004). Their suppliers are expected to provide them with a
number of related modules(1) that are ready to be assembled on the production line,
and they are expected to become responsible for the design of these modules. In this
way, lead firms are able to change and improve components with ease (Camuffo,
2002) and outsource and/or relocate module design and production more easily (Sturgeon
and Lester, 2004).
One of the most notable features of this organisational change has been the rise
of full-service suppliers which are capable of designing complex modules and systems
on the basis of the specific requirements of their assemblers using their own tech-
nologies, and of supplying them in globally dispersed geographies. While this has
enabled lead firms to transfer product-development and design costs to component
suppliers and take advantage of their specialised technological skills and competences
(Humphrey, 2003a), it has undoubtedly also increased opportunities for component
suppliers (Dicken, 2003). Yusuf (2004, page 11), for example, argues that full-service
supply has provided opportunities for local East Asian suppliers to earn the higher
profits which accrue from close longer-term relationships and the joint development
of technology, and has forced them to double their efforts in building technological
capabilitiesöor be squeezed out of the GVCs of lead firms (Yusuf, 2004, page 11).
Dicken (2003, page 19) noted, however, that these opportunities have been ``tempered
by a clear and increasing preference by lead firms to work with a smaller number of
suppliers''. Since the 1990s the automotive industry has seen major consolidations,
giving rise to global suppliers which have increased their technological competences
and have expanded their global reach through the acquisition of competitors from
across the world (Humphrey, 2000; Humphrey and Memedovic, 2003; MacDuffie and
Helper, 2005; Sturgeon, 2002; 2003). These firms have become the preferred suppliers
(1) ``Modules are units in a larger system that are structurally independent of one another, but work
together'' (Baldwin and Clark, 2000, page 63) to provide a specific function (Dicken, 2003).
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of lead firms, and are taking on greater responsibilities in component and module
design and product development. A subsequent impact of this reorganisation has
been the systematisation of the supply industry in tiers in terms of the division of
labour, with distinct requirements of the suppliers in each tier (Humphrey andMemedovic,
2003).
This process of industrial organisation and the resulting emergence of new sets of
actors imply that new forms of governance are required which will allow lead firms to
coordinate their globally dispersed value chains. It also implies that customer ^ supplier
relations in the automotive industry are all about power. Over the last few decades,
the GVC perspective has emerged as a fruitful approach, which focuses on the asym-
metrical power relationships between lead firms and their suppliers in producer-driven
chains, such as the automotive industry (Barnes and Kaplinsky, 2000; Barnes et al,
2004; Humphrey, 2003a; Humphrey and Memedovic, 2003; Layan, 2000; Posthuma,
2005). `Value-chain governance' reflects power asymmetries that arise due to the power
of lead firms in global chains to coordinate what is to be produced, how it is to be
produced, and how much will be produced (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Humphrey
and Schmitz, 2000; 2002b).
The GVC literature has identified four types of relations that have been established
to achieve coordination in GVCs, each of which is associated with different power
asymmetries. In market-based chains the basis of the customer ^ supplier relationship is
price information and specifications (Gereffi et al, 2005; Sturgeon, 2002). Suppliers
produce a range of standard products which are available to a wide range of customers,
and the selection of these suppliers is based on price-based competition (Humphrey,
2003b). In captive chains suppliers carry out specific tasks, following detailed instruc-
tions provided by their customers: the customers are responsible for product design
(Dicken, 2003; Humphrey, 2003b). This means that the same part can be sourced from
a number of different suppliers, who are awarded contracts based on price. Hence,
in captive chains customer ^ supplier relations are asymmetrical: suppliers are subordi-
nate to powerful lead firms who specify product and process characteristics, leaving
them with little autonomy to develop relatively independent strategies and thus under-
take activities requiring a higher skill content (see Humphrey, 2003a; Humphrey and
Schmitz, 2000; 2002a; 2002b; Schmitz, 2004). Before the 1980s, interfirm relationships
put in place to achieve coordination in the automotive value chain were characterised
by captive, or market-based, relations. As production in the automotive industry has
become more and more globally dispersed, supply chains have had to accommodate
more sophisticated forms of coordinationöespecially in relation to the integration
of components into the design of modules and systems; and in relation to quality
standards, leading to more complex customer ^ supplier relationships, which persist
over longer periods (Follis et al, 2002; MacDuffie and Helper, 2005; Sadler, 1998;
Sturgeon et al, 2008). Now, lead firms and suppliers increasingly work together on
the components for particular vehicles, and component suppliers are responsible not
only for making the products according to the lead firms' specifications and delivering
them in a timely fashion, but also for designing a solution, adapting a basic design to
the customer's specific requirements, or designing a module or subsystem using their
own technology. This implies a rise in importance of network-based value chains in the
automotive industryöthese can take two forms: relational and modular. Relational
chains are characterised by more even relationships and build on complementary
competences between the supplier and the customer, with the customer maintaining
thick relations with suppliers who are involved in the design and product-development
stages.
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Unlike relational chains, modular value chains (2) are characterised by a high degree
of codifiable transfer of standards and specifications from lead firms to their various
suppliers, who use identical or compatible production and technology systems; these
chains thereby feature only loose and thin relational interactions (Gereffi et al, 2005;
Sturgeon, 2002; Sturgeon and Lester, 2004). Modular value chains also necessitate the
ability of suppliers to specify their own processes and use their own technology to
manufacture components or modules according to the design specifications provided
by lead firms. One other important aspect of a modular chain is the need for suppliers
to be able to design a solution by adapting a basic design to the customers' specific
requirements; or to design a module or subsystem using their own technology. Defined
in this way, in modular chains competent suppliers have an independent status vis-a© -vis
their customers, which allows them to provide a wider range of services and have less
dependence on the lead firm (Sturgeon, 2002; 2003).
Recently, Gereffi et al (2005) associated the types of value chain governance outlined
above with combinations of three dimensions: the complexity of interfirm transactions; the
ability to codify transactions; and the capabilities of suppliers (Gereffi et al, 2005).
Combinations of these three variables locate the types of value chain governance
between two extremes, ranging from nonexplicit coordination and power symmetry,
to high explicit coordination and power asymmetry (table 1). The identification of the
types of chain governance and the degree of power asymmetries associated with
each type is important, as chain governance determines the extent to which a firm
gains profits as they upgrade to assume responsibility for and control over more value-
added activities in the chain (Tokatl| and K|z|lgu« n, 2004). This issue is addressed in
section 3.
(2) A common use of the term `modularity' refers to product architecture. Much of the discussion
in relation to product modularity contains the idea that the product architecture of motor vehicles
is modular, as it is in electronics. Others underline that the integral nature of product architecture
in vehicles puts limits on modularity since it requires ensuring the compatibility of components
and subsystems in order to make them work as a product when put together (Herrigel, 2004;
Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Sako, 2002). It should be noted at this point that `modularity' also
encompasses `value chain' and `organisational' modularity (see Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001). A
`modular value chain' does not refer to a chain that depends on products having a modular product
architecture but, as Humphrey and Schmitz (2004, page 377) explain, the term is used by GVC
researchers `` because of the analogy between a design that minimizes the customization of parts
and the network that minimizes the customization of supplier ^ buyer relationships''.
3
3
Table 1. Types of global value chain governance (source: adapted from Gereffi et al (2005);
survey data).
Type of Ability to Complexity Supplier Degree of explicit Number and
governance codify the of the capability coordination and share (%) of
transaction transaction power asymmetry firms
Market high low high low 12 (12.5)
Modular high high high 55 (57.3)
Relational low high high –
Captive high high low 19 (19.8)
Hierarchy low high low nia
high
Exclusion high low low 10 (10.4)
Unlikely low low high ni
Unlikely low low low ni
a ni—not included
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3 Value chain dynamics and upgrading
In GVC terms the fact that the coordination of automotive value chains has required
more collaborative, network-based relations between lead firms and competent suppli-
ers has significant implications upon supplier upgrading. It suggests that, through
direct participation in such chains, component manufacturers in newly industrialising
countries could leverage design capabilities and move from manufacturing to compo-
nent design (Sturgeon and Lester, 2004). According to Sturgeon (2002, page 483),
being inserted into modular value chains is an important step in supplier upgrading,
since in such chains supplier firms provide `` services that require very little support
or inputöbeyond design specifications from customer firms''. Hence, by making the
supplier an important part of the automotive value chain, the firm is put on a learning
curve. This yields benefits beyond quality and flexibility, and forces the suppliers
`` to add entirely new competence areas, increasing the scope of activities while improv-
ing quality, delivery and cost performance'' (page 455), implying that suppliers learn
and upgrade beyond production. In the automotive industry, upgrading in production
involves innovation oriented towards increasing the flexibility of production and the
speed of the production process, improving the quality of products and production
processes, and improving cost performance. It also includes the integration of various
components of the automotive value chain through the use of highly automated and
standardised technologies, and improving the efficiency of production and other activ-
ities by introducing new organisational methods. However, this does not bring as much
profit as do product and functional upgrading as long as the related competences
remain in the lead firms. Product upgrading involves moving into product lines with
a higher unit value, and this is achieved by introducing new products, designs, or
product-development processes. Improving through functional upgrading, that is,
moving into higher value-added activities such as branding and marketing, is more
difficult and requires the use of intangible assets rather than tangible ones (Tokatl| and
K|z|lgu« n, 2004).
In the 1990s a few high-performing Asian economies, such as Korea, Malaysia,
Taiwan, Thailand, and China, leveraged design capabilities, and consequently manufac-
turers have emerged which are capable of designing products for their customersöthe
branded manufacturers (Dicken, 2003; Sturgeon and Lester, 2004; Veloso and Kumar,
2002). It was anticipated that in time they would develop capabilities in conceptualising,
designing, and manufacturing finished products under their own brand, which would
eventually enable them to emerge as lead firms in their own right. However, functional
upgrading, especially in the form of shifts from design-oriented activities to branding and
marketing activities, and later to becoming lead firms in their own right, has proven
to be difficult for many of these suppliers. Sturgeon and Lester (2004) noted that for
many firms, the upgrading path stopped in the design phase for the simple reason
that many firms retreated from the strategy of own-brand production to that of own
design and production, the reason being that there was a reluctance to encroach upon the
core competences of their customers.
For most of the suppliers in these countries, however, it was their failure to acquire
the competences required for more collaborative relations to develop that halted their
upgrade path (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004; Sturgeon and Lester, 2004). For example,
Takayasu and Mori (2004) noted that Thai firms had been slow to acquire the tech-
nology and design skills that would enable them to work more closely with assemblers
and first-tier suppliers in R&D and design. A similar situation exists in China where,
as Steinfeld (2004) noted, most of the suppliers work with codified technologies to
produce standardised commodities, with the minimum of design and R&D inputs.
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The situation was even worse for less favoured regions on the periphery of
automotive production. The lack of higher value-added competences had generally
confined the vast majority of these suppliers to remain locked-in in captive value
chains, in which the lead firms dictated the cost, flexibility, and quality requirements,
while also collecting real rents (Humphrey, 2003a; Humphrey and Memedovic, 2003).
The challenges presented by the rise of global lead firms also made it increasingly
difficult for these suppliers to upgrade their capabilities to include design, produce
development, marketing, and branding (Sturgeon and Lester, 2004). Evren (2002,
page 299), for example, suggests that the Turkish automotive industry was `` excluded
from all the core activities such as design and product development'' and argued that
the possibility for the development of `` smart activities and innovation in less favoured
regions'' was unlikely `` unless parent firms change[d] their production and local sourcing
strategies''.
Since then, however, GVC research has established that power relations are not
static but, rather, are constituted, transformed and reconstituted through asymmetrical
and evolving power relations (Dicken et al, 2001, page 105), implying that the limits and
barriers associated with specific modes of value chain governance might be temporary
(Gereffi et al, 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b; Oë zatag­ an, 2011; Sturgeon, 2009;
Sturgeon et al, 2008; Tokatl|, 2007; 2008). This may be due to two factors. First, existing
suppliers may acquire new capabilities, which may in turn decrease the need for global
lead firms to maintain control over these suppliers. One major reason why lead firms
establish asymmetric power relationships/tight coordination is to militate against the
risk of supplier failure. As the competences of suppliers increase, lead firms may be
more likely to vacate certain spaces, and chain governance can be expected to loosen
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002a; 2002b).
Second, lead firms governing a specific value chain may be willing to relinquish
some functions into which producers might move (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002a). On
this issue, recent evidence shows that manufacturers in the hierarchy of a supply
chain have taken on new roles. For example, there have been increasing requests
from second-tier suppliers for design expertise. Herrigel (2004), for example, shows
that first-tier suppliers which are increasingly charged by vehicle assemblers with the
responsibility for design and product development of increasingly complex modules
and systems have faced difficulties in mastering design, technology, and manufacturing
operations. By increasingly calling upon their suppliers to take on design responsibil-
ities, while retaining overall control of the product-development process, they have
sought to optimise their learning processes, minimise costs, and share the risks.
Evidence from Fiat's Piedmontese auto-production system in Italy (Whitford and
Enrietti, 2005) reinforces Herrigels findings: where requests from second-tier suppliers
for design expertise have seen a marked increase. In addition, there is evidence that the
pressure placed on higher tier suppliers to innovate has been passed down the auto-
motive supply chain. Follis et al (2002), for example, show that lower tier suppliers
have been put under pressure by their customers to innovate, and a substantial
majority deliver on a just-in-time basis to their clients.
All of this recent evidence indicates that design and product development is less
confined to the domain of direct suppliers to vehicle manufacturers, and that the
increasingly standard practices observed in the higher tiers of the supply chain are
being replicated at lower levels. This is an important development, as it indicates that
the distribution of power in the automotive supply chain has changed, and hence
implies a shift in value chain governance. What, then, are the consequences for
supplier upgrading, and the diffusion of higher value-added competences from the
top to further down the hierarchy of the supply chain? In this paper I aim to provide
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answers to these questions, but before that, in section 4 I look at the automotive
industry in Bursa, and the dynamics of its integration into the European and global
automotive systems since the 1990s. This is followed by a detailed investigation of the
governance of the automotive value chain in Bursa.
4 Empirical evidence
4.1 Bursa and its insertion into the European and global automotive system
Bursa is a major automotive component-producing node in Turkey, the emergence of
which dates back to the late 1960s when the manufacturing plants of Fiat and Renault
were established there through joint ventures with the Turkish Tofas and Oyak Groups,
and when KARSAN began automobile production under license from Peugeot. Like
many manufacturing nodes elsewhere in the world, Bursa underwent a profound
structural change after a gradual process of deregulation and trade liberalisation.
This started with the export-oriented industrialisation strategy adopted in 1980, and
continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s when suppliers were forced to compete
internationally and adjust to the rapidly changing conditions of the global market
(for details see Oë zatag­ an, 2011).
From a GVC perspective the major implication of this adjustment process was that
suppliers could link-up with a diverse array of lead firms. First, the automotive sector
witnessed a significant increase in foreign investments. New assembly-line investments
were realised in Turkey,(3) there were also significant increases in the shares of existing
car manufacturers.(4) These new assembly investments encouraged new foreign invest-
ments into the component industry; and in line with the global sourcing strategies of
these assemblers, foreign component suppliers were either encouraged to take over the
most successful suppliers or to establish greenfield investments.(5) Second, domestic
suppliers entered export markets, establishing ties with a variety of lead firms. The
value of automotive exports from Bursa reached US$1.56 billion in 2002, and more
than doubled to reach US $3.65 billion in 2006 (Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry
for Foreign Trade, 2007). Third, thanks to the Customs Union, the EU has become
the major trade partner of suppliers both in Bursa and in Turkey as a whole in the
automotive industry. Since 1995 the share of the value of Turkish automotive exports
to EU countries has undergone a gradual increase: by the 2000s suppliers in Bursa
and the rest of Turkey had achieved full-scale integration into the European regional
automotive system. By 2003, 73% of the US $6.5 billion automotive exports of Turkey
were oriented towards EU25 (KOSGEB, 2004).
The increasing role of global lead firms, coupled with Turkey's trade agreement
with the EU, has had a significant impact on the supply industry in Bursa. There has
been a significant rise in process standards and product quality. The assemblers and
their lead firms which entered the Turkish market have developed models and product
and process specifications, helped component manufacturers in the technology and
organisation of production, and inspected the quality of their products and processes
on-site. Suppliers in Bursa concentrated on the production process, with the lead firms
retaining responsibility for product development and design. Gereffi (1999, page 53)
attributes this process to `organisational succession', which implies that the succession
of lead firms permitted suppliers in Bursa to learn a great deal from global lead firms
(3) Of the seventeen vehicle assemblers in Turkey, eight had seen an increase in the share of foreign
capital by 2007.
(4) By 2007 nine vehicle manufacturers had increased their share of foreign capital.
(5) The number of foreign component suppliers in Turkey increased from 138 in 1999 (Istanbul
Sanayi Odas|, 2002) to 163 in 2005 (Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade,
2005).
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on how to improve their production processes, raise quality standards, and increase the
speed of response in meeting customer demands. In GVC terms, this implies that
the lead firms employed captive modes of coordination in the supply of components
from manufacturers in Bursa. Since then, however, there have been new developments
in the organisation of automotive production. As explained in section 3, the global
automotive industry has undergone much change since the 1990s, and this has been
paralleled by changes in the nature of the interactions between the lead firms and their
suppliers in Bursa. In the remainder of this paper I aim to unveil the impact of this
transformation on suppliers on the periphery of automotive production, concentrating
on the ways in which governance of the automotive value chain in Bursa has evolved,
and on the implications of this evolution for supplier upgrading.
4.2 Data
The survey data were collected in the period December 2005 ^December 2006 by
means of structured face-to-face interviews with the owners, managers, foreign-trade
managers, or purchasing managers of 103 component suppliers in Bursa, with a response
rate of 28%.(6)
The survey involved the gathering of information of two key types:
(a) firm specific: providing information on firms' innovative processes; and
(b) transaction specific: providing information on firms'customers and the nature of the
interaction with their most important/main customer (the customer with the highest
share in the firm's total sales).
The first dataset provided an understanding of the innovation activities associated
with product, process, and functional upgrading (see appendix); the second set was
used to develop a typology of value chain governance in line with the one suggested
by Gereffi et al (2005). This was used to provide a systematic understanding of the
ways in which the relationships between suppliers and their lead firms are coordinated,
and to anticipate the ways in which the governance structures in the automotive value
chain of Bursa have evolved.(7) To this end, three dimensions of governance were
identified.
1. The extent to which transactions are codified: based on the answer of the respondent
to the question of to what extent the firm's main customer:
(a) specifies product and process characteristics and
(b) imposes quality and technical standards.
2. The complexity of the transaction: this was identified based on the answer of the
respondent to the question of to what extent the firm's main customer takes part in:
(a) product and process development;
(b) upgrading technology; and
(c) training.
3. Supplier capability: this was identified based on the answer of the respondent to the
question of to what extent the firm is engaged in:
(a) the definition of product characteristics, including:
 improving original designs and specifications and
 modifying and improving product features;
(6) For details of the collection of data and an overview of the general characteristics of suppliers in
Bursa, see Oë zatag­ an (2011).
(7) Gereffi et al (2005, page 101) underline that ``A high priority for the future will be the develop-
ment of methods for measuring the key variables in the model [they suggested]. Effective proxies
for transactional complexity, level of codification, and supplier competence must be identified and
tested in the field''; their paper is one of the rare attempts to do this (for another, see Pietrobelli
and Saliola, 2008). See also Sturgeon and Gereffi (2009), who suggest improved measures of
industrial upgrading and technological learning in GVCs.
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(b) research and development activities:
 developing new products,
 developing new production processes/methods, and
 developing new designs.
In the survey, firms were requested to attribute a degree to each of the variables
under each dimension in a three-point Likert-scale of: `no', `to some extent', and `to a
large extent'. A coefficient was assigned for each dimension, calculated as the sum of
the points attributed to each variable under the relevant dimension, divided by the
maximum possible score for each of the three dimensions (6 for the first dimension,
9 for the second, and 15 for the third dimension).
Cutting across these three dimensions, firms were classified on the basis of the
value of the coefficients in each dimension as `high', `medium ^ high', `medium', `low',
and `no'. However, in order to overcome the problem of insufficient frequencies and
complexity, the number of categories was reduced to two: `low' or `high'. Firms were
then classified on the basis of their `high' and `low' positions for each of the three
dimensions, which were then combined to yield eight possible types of value chain
governance, reflecting different degrees of power asymmetry (see table 1).(8)
4.3 Automotive value chain governance in Bursa
Table 1 reveals some important results, indicating that supply chains require sophisti-
cated forms of coordination, and subsequently that network-based value chains have
become increasingly important in the automotive industry. This is evident first in the
limited share (10.4%) of the e`xclusion' governance type in Bursa, implying that it has
become a requirement for suppliers to possess a minimum in certain competences
if they are to be included in automotive value chains. This is also evident from the
limited share of captive and market-based chains (19.8% and 12.5%, respectively).
As mentioned above, as suppliers in the automotive industry are increasingly given
responsibility for design and product development, investment in supplier relationships
has become a requirement for such collaborations. Evidence from Bursa implies that
in this context it has become increasingly difficult to maintain captive and market-
based relations (see MacDuffie and Helper, 2005; Sturgeon et al, 2008). Finally, it is
evident from the significant share of network-based relations, that there are relatively
more collaborative types of governance (which in the case of Bursa took the form
of modular value chainsö57.3%), characterised by working to the specifications of
customers, sharing competences, and higher supplier capability in design and product
development.
This is an important finding, in that it conflicts with the suggestion that the diffusion
of design and product-development capabilities is an exception which is confined to
direct suppliers of lead firms, or to a few, high-performing, Asian economies which have
(8) Of the eight outcomes, Gereffi et al (2005) treat the first five as modes of governance. In GVC
terms, hierarchical chains reflect intrafirm trade between a transnational corporation and its
subsidiaries. In this paper I treat each semiindependent subsidiary as an independent profit centre
(see Dunford, 2009) and look at the interfirm relations of subsidiaries with their customers. This
necessitates the type `hierarchy' to be discarded. The type named e`xclusion' here represents
a situation in which firms are likely to be excluded from the value chain due to their low
capabilitiesödespite the low complexity of the transaction and the high ability to codify the
transaction. Gereffi et al (2005) recognised the importance of this outcome, but did not consider
it as a governance type in its own right; however, assuming that it may be a widespread outcome
on the periphery of automotive production, in this paper I treat this as a type. The `unlikely'
outcomes represent combinations of low complexity of transactions and low ability to codify.
These outcomes are excluded from further investigation with the assumption that the ques-
tionnaires were not successful (seven firms). In all, ninety-six supplier firms were found to be
distributed among five types of value chain governance.
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been able to move up the value chain (Steinfeld, 2004; Sturgeon and Lester, 2004;
Takayasu and Mori, 2004); and that the development of innovation capabilities among
lower tier suppliers in less favoured regions is less likely (Evren, 2002; Humphrey and
Schmitz, 2004). Instead, this new evidence from Bursa suggests a more widespread
trend towards the diffusion of design competences in GVCs than has been suggested
in previous literatureöthis also includes lower tier suppliers in other countries on the
periphery of automotive production, like those in Turkey.
4.4 Value-chain governance and supplier upgrading
What, then, are the consequences for upgrading of increasing supplier competences
and the subsequent shift in value chain governance in Bursaöfrom captive to modular
value chains? In this section I attempt to answer this question by comparing the types
of GVC governance observed in Bursa in terms of the differences in innovation
activities associated with process, product, and functional upgrading.
This was done by applying an ANOVA test (see appendix for innovation variables
used). The analysis did not provide significant results for the homogencity of variances
test for innovation in technology systems, innovation in work systems, and process
improvements (significance less than 0.05, see table 2). Because cell variances for these
variables are unequal, interpretations rested on the figures from a Brown ^Forsythe
test as a substitute (table 3). The Brown ^Forsythe test also did not provide significant
results for innovation in technology systems. The results (table 4) indicate that a firm's
innovativeness in the organisational system and in marketing and branding do not vary
Table 2. Type of global value chain governance and innovation: test of homogeneity of variances.
Levene Degrees of Degrees of Significance
statistic freedom 1 freedom 2
Innovation in technology systems 5.380 3 92 0.002
Marketing and branding 0.504 3 92 0.680
Design, product, and process 1.650 3 92 0.183
development
Innovation in work systems 6.887 3 92 0.000
Innovation in organisational systems 1.219 3 92 0.307
Improvements in production process 20.926 3 92 0.000
Table 3. Type of global value chain governance and innovation: robust tests of equality of means.
Brown – Degrees of Degrees of Significance
Forsythe freedom 1 freedom 2
statistica
Innovation in technology systems 4.154 3 23.822 0.017
Marketing and branding 2.795 3 43.697 0.051
Design, product, and process 9.190 3 39.360 0.000
development
Innovation in work systems 2.573 3 27.046 0.075
Innovation in organisational systems 2.585 3 50.587 0.063
Improvements in production processb nac na na na
aAsymptotically F-distributed.
bRobust tests of equality of means cannot be performed for improvements in production
process because at least one group has 0 variance.
c na—not applicable.
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Table 4. Type of global value chain governance and innovation: results of ANOVA.
Sum of Degrees Mean F Significance
squares of freedom square
Innovation in technology BGa 1.014 3 0.338 6.091 0.001
systems WGb 5.107 92 0.056
total 6.121 95
Marketing and branding BG 1.061 3 0.354 2.539 0.061
WG 12.811 92 0.139
total 13.872 95
Design, product, and BG 2.810 3 0.937 8.784 0.000
process development WG 9.812 92 0.107
total 12.622 95
Innovation in work BG 1.105 3 0.368 4.400 0.006
systems WG 7.704 92 0.084
total 8.809 95
Innovation in BG 0.937 3 0.312 2.094 0.106
organisational systems WG 13.725 92 0.149
total 14.662 95
Improvements in BG 0.299 3 0.100 5.855 0.001
production process WG 1.566 92 0.017
total 1.865 95
a BG—between groups.
bWG—within groups.
Table 5. Type of global value chain (GVC) governance and innovativeness: results of post hoc
least significant difference (LSD) test.
Type of innovation Type of GVC governancea
I modular II market III captive IV exclusion ANOVA LSD testb
(signifi-
cance)
Innovation in 0.8839 0.7692 0.7976 0.5462 0.001
technology systemsc
Marketing and branding 0.4364 0.5000 0.2368 0.2000 0.061
Design, product, and 0.6364 0.4167 0.2763 0.2250 0.000 I>II, III, IV
process development
Innovation in work 1.1766 0.9643 1.0526 0.8714 0.006 I>II, IV
systems
Innovation in 0.8273 0.5972 0.8684 0.6167 0.106
organisational systems
Improvements in 0.8273 0.5972 0.8684 0.6167 0.001 I, II, III>IV
production process
aMean value per type of GVC governance.
b This test compares the means of all possible pairs of categories of ‘GVC governance’ and
identifies particular pairs which show statistically significant mean differences. Here I provided
information on the pairs of means which are statistically different (for example, the innovativeness
of modular chains regarding design, product, and process development is significantly higher than
chains governed by market-based, captive, and exclusion types of relations).
c The LSD test used for identifying significant mean differences between pairs of GVC
governance types on innovation in technology systems is Tamhane’s T2, since for this variable
the assumption of equal variances is not met. However, the Tamhane's T2-statistic did not
provide statistically significant differences between different pairs of GVC governance types.
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according to the type of GVC governance. In addition, they suggest that differences in
a firm's innovativeness in `design, product, and process development', `work systems',
and `process improvements' can be attributed to the type of GVC governance into
which the suppliers in Bursa are integrated.
In order to understand which differences are the most important and contribute
most to the significant F-ratios for these differences, a post-hoc test (least significant
differences test) was carried out. Table 5 shows that firms that are faced with exclusion
are typically different from firms inserted in other types of chains in terms of their
relatively low mean values in various types of innovative activities. Firms in market-
based and captive chains are different only from firms with exclusion-types of relations
with relatively higher mean values of process improvements. Modular value chains
are distinguished from all other types of GVC governance by their relatively higher
mean values of innovation in design, product, and process development. Modular value
chains are also different from market-based chains, as they have higher mean values
of innovation in work systems; however, they do not show significantly higher mean
values of innovativeness in marketing and branding-innovation activities than those
of other types of GVC governance.
What are the overall implications of these findings? First, they indicate that
innovative behaviour associated with process upgrading is widespread in Bursa, regard-
less of the ways in which the chain is governedöby market-based, captive, or modular
relations. This is not a surprising outcome, as it is widely acknowledged that the
current global reorganisation of the automotive industry is taking place according to
a strategy that is designed to leverage suppliers to increase product and process quality,
while at the same time cutting costs and meeting higher productivity targets. This
forces suppliers into innovative behaviour with regard to process upgrading (Dyker
et al, 2003).
However, significant differences emerge when it comes to product upgrading. Here,
suppliers operating in modular value chains are in a more favourable position than
those operating in other types of chains, as they seem to have upgraded their capabil-
ities and moved into design and product development. However, the results indicate
that they may continue to encounter barriers when it comes to moving into marketing
and branding-related innovation activities, implying that leading-edge innovation
activities remain in the domain of lead firms. It seems that despite the increasing
competences of suppliers and the subsequent shift in value chain governance, power
asymmetries along the value chain continue to be well protected by lead firms (see also
Tokatl| et al, 2008), and lead firms continue to have a major influence on the type of
upgrading strategies that are open to their suppliers.
5 Conclusion
Building on the GVC perspective in this paper I have provided an account of the shifts
in value chain governance and upgrading in the automotive value chain in Bursa,
Turkey. One of the main findings is that as suppliers in Bursa have gained competences
in design and product development, their customers have turned to modular value
chains in sourcing from them. This implies that design and product development are
now less confined to the domain of direct suppliers to vehicle manufacturers, and that
the consequences of the current reorganisation of the automotive industry have
included a further diffusion of design and product-development capabilities among
suppliers on the periphery of automotive production, such as those in Bursa. It would
appear that Turkish suppliers have managed to build on the opportunities offered
by value chain leaders and developed further capabilities, and as a result are likely to
be able to command higher prices.
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However, the comparison of the types of GVC governance observed in Bursa in
terms of differences in the innovation activities associated with process, product, and
functional upgrading indicate that although more and more responsibilities have
been passed to Turkish suppliers as they have upgraded their capabilities to include
design and product development, suppliers in Bursa continue to encounter barriers
when it comes to moving into marketing and branding-related innovation activities.
This suggests that cutting-edge innovation activities such as marketing and branding
remain with the lead firms, the reason being that as these higher value-added
competences are spread to new suppliers, the returns to the lead firms decline, and
thus the value of such competences is devalued (see Schrank, 2004, page 125). In
addition, the risk of supplier failure is reproduced for higher value-added activities
such as marketing and branding, meaning that careful coordination is required (see
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b). This implies that power asymmetries along the
automotive value chain continue to be protected by lead firms, bringing into question
the real level of opportunity for upgrading for suppliers on the periphery of GVCs.
This raises an important question: does the increased capability of Turkish suppli-
ers in design and product development imply a reduction of power asymmetries
with their customers? Or does it imply that they are encroaching on the core compe-
tences of their customers? The findings, together with the impressions of the author
from the field study, suggest that the upgrading of Turkish suppliers in design and
product development has been less due to Turkish suppliers successfully encroaching on
the core competences of their customers, and more to the willingness of lead firms
in the automotive industry to relinquish those functions towards competent suppliersö
down the hierarchy of the supply chain. By shifting design responsibilities to their
suppliers, lead firms are able also to pass the costs and risks of these activities on to
them (Follis et al, 2002; Herrigel, 2004; Whitford and Enrietti, 2005). In fact, my
impression from the field study is that being innovative in design and product devel-
opment has become a `must' for suppliers if they are to become part of the global
automotive value chain, as suppliers are forced to adopt this strategy or lose business.
This suggests that the shift of design responsibility to suppliers is a means for lead
firms to extend their power (see also Tokatl| et al, 2008). In this regard, the upgrading
of Turkish suppliers in design and product development seems more likely to be a
result of lead-firm strategies to peripheralise their traditionally core activities (Schrank,
2004), and hence does not imply that suppliers are encroaching on the core compe-
tences of their customers (see also Crewe and Davenport, 1992; Tokatl| et al, 2008).
It would seem instead that asymmetric power relations are being maintained in the
global automotive industry, and that lead firms continue to have a major influence on
the type of upgrading strategies that are open to their suppliers. To date, Turkish
suppliers have been employing a strategy to build on opportunities offered by value
chain leaders to develop capabilities in such fields as design and product development,
through which they are more likely to be able to command higher prices. However,
given that these competences are being devalued every day, building on value chain
resources may not be sufficient in the long term, and these firms may require more
viable strategies if they are to continuously increase their levels of competences.
To ensure sustainability, strategic efforts at a firm level to take steps to develop higher
value-added capabilities from which they can earn profits will be important. It is only
when a company manages to upgrade beyond the requirements of its customers, and
earn additional profits, that it can be said to be encroaching on the core competences
of its customers.
Obviously, the question remains open as to whether or not Turkish suppliers'
development of higher value-added competences is essentially superficial, as is the
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question of how deeply Turkish suppliers are involved in those higher value-added
tasks. It is possible that a further study, aimed at a deeper examination of frontier
suppliers, would reveal whether or not the competences of Turkish suppliers have truly
increased: this is beyond the scope of this particular paper. Although such a study
might take us back to the importance of corporate inquiry in shedding light upon the
diversity and complexity of value chains, the power relations that characterise them,
and upgrading strategies in global value chains, by attempting to identify patterns of
chain governance and test the established hypotheses on the relationship between chain
governance and upgrading, this paper provides a starting point for understanding
how shifts in power asymmetries in value chains and changing opportunities for
suppliers in developing economies are linked to recent changes in the organisation
of the automotive industry.
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Appendix
Measurement of innovation activities associated with process, product, and functional
upgrading.
1. Process upgrading
(i) Process improvements: based on the question of the extent to which firms undertake
the following activities on a four-point Likert scale: (a) never, (b) sometimes, (c) usually,
(d) always:
 increasing production speed,
 cost-price reduction,
 improving delivery speed,
 improving product quality.
A coefficient was calculated as the sum of `usually' and `always' answers divided by the
number of variables (four).
(ii) Innovation in work systems: based on the extent to which the following activities
are applied by the respondent firm, on a three-point Likert scale of: (a) not applied,
(b) to some extent, (c) to a great extent:
 documentation of procedures,
 use of batch trays,
 use of statistical process cards,
 use of travel cards,
 collection and analysis of cell performance data,
 stock control and traceability.
A coefficient was calculated as the sum of `to a great extent' answers divided by the
number of variables (six).
(iii) Innovation in human resource management/organisational systems: based on the
question of the extent to which the following activities are applied by the respondent
firm, on a three-point Likert scale: (a) not applied, (b) to some extent, (c) to a great extent:
 team working,
 suggestion schemes,
 workplace rotation,
 delegation of responsibility,
 performance reward systems,
 personal development schemes.
A coefficient was calculated as the sum of `to a great extent' answers divided by the
number of variables (six).
(iv) Innovation in technology systems: based on the question of whether or not the
respondent firm has invested in the following IT hardware and software:
 process technology:
computer-aided production equipment,
computer-aided design equipment,
statistical process cards,
 logistics technology:
office automation,
automation in design activities,
automation in quality control,
automation of equipment,
automation in information systems for organising production flow,
 quality:
total quality management,
quality-assurance systems,
quality-control methods.
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A coefficient was calculated as the sum of all `yes' answers divided by the number of
variables (eleven).
2. Product upgrading
(v) Product and process development: based on the question of the extent to which
the respondent firm undertakes the following activities on a four-point Likert scale:
(a) never, (b) sometimes, (c) usually, (d) always:
 develop new products,
 develop new processes,
 modification of existing products and processes,
 develop new designs.
A coefficient was calculated as the sum of `usually' and `always' answers divided by the
number of variables (four).
3. Functional upgrading
(vi) marketing and branding: based on the question of the extent to which the respon-
dent firm undertakes marketing and branding activities on a four-point Likert scale:
(a) never, (b) sometimes, (c) usually, (d) always:
.......
A coefficient was calculated as the sum of `usually' and `always' answers divided by the
number of variables (two).
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